Good afternoon. Good afternoon. There we go. I know it's raining outside but we can be awake and excited and lively in here. I'm Michael Barr, I'm the dean of Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy here at the University of Michigan. I'm delighted to welcome you all here to the Ford School, to welcome our wonderful panelist. We're going to hear from four distinguished diplomats on the topic of U.S., Iran, and Security in the Persian Gulf. Not a small or uncomplicated topic. The director of the Weiser Diplomacy Center, my colleague John Ciorciari, will introduce our honored guests in a moment. Before he does that, I want to say a few words of welcome and a few word about the Weiser Diplomacy Center. Today is the final event in our semester long series that launched here at the Ford school. Briefly mission of the Weiser diplomacy center is to provide practical training to students interested in international affairs. Inform verge on type I cans related to diplomacy and serve as a hundred with the foreign policy community. The Weiser Diplomacy Center has brought an amazing array of visitors here. We've hosted two former secretaries of state i former ambassador to the united nations. Former national security advisor and the current special representative for North Korea. Who was recently nominated to serve as deputy Secretary of State. Not a bad lineup even before today. We have a wonderful panel today as well. The Weiser diplomacy series I described elevated the caliber of discussion about diplomacy and foreign policy here at the University of Michigan. And it elevated the Ford school's pronile policy making and diplomats in Washington, D.C. and around the world. I want to offer my deepest gratitude to ambassador and Mrs. Weiser who are here with us today and to their entire family for their generous gift and for their vision of this amazing program here at the Ford school. Please join me the thanking Ron and ilene. [applause] many of you will snow that Ron served as discuss ambassador and ilene serve add long side them. They are both passionately committed to the importance of diplomacy and to the men and women ho serve our country abroad. We're grateful for their friendship and support of the Ford school and University of Michigan. We appreciate your work and the great gift you've given to our community. We are deeply grateful. Today's event and the series was hosted as part of the Ford's school conversations across difference initiative bringing people from lots of different political backgrounds and perspectives here to the Ford school to talk about foreign policy. Practicing diplomacy both abroad and here at home is essential for working through moments where differences seem insurmountable. The art of talking and of listening across political and other differences is critical for advancing public policy and diplomacy alike. With that let me turn things over to John who will introduce our panel. [applause] . hello everybody and welcome. Lady like to thank the Weiser family and the American academy of diplomacy. The topic we're going to address is timely and extremely important. We're going to talk about U.S. Iran relations , the nuclear deal, politics and security in the gulf more generally and of course those issues are linked to a whole range of other regional issues relevant to U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East from Israel and the Palestinian territories to the conflicts in sir y Yemen, Afghanistan and beyond. And to have a discussion on such an important and wide range ago Ray of issues we've assembled a dream team of diplomats with experience in the region. I'm going to introduce them briefly. Trust me introducing them in a time efficient manner requires a lot of distillation of their incredible accomplishments across decades in U.S. foreign service. I'm going to start on my left, your right with ambassador Gerald Feierstein who is a 41 year career veteran in the foreign service. Now retired he was ambassador to Yemen during the Obama administration from 2010-13. Principle deputy assistant deputy of state for Middle East affairs from 2013-16 and many other crucial post including deputy chief of mission mission this Pakistan and in the counter terrorism bureau and postings elsewhere in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, jambeau and he's now senior Vice President of the Middle East institute which is a leading think tank in Washington. Immediately to his right is ambassador Patrick Theros who is president and executive director at the business council. He has a foreign service career with many distinguished post including U.S. ambassador to qatar and advisor to commander in chief for the U.S. military command with coverage of the Middle East region. He is also been deputy chief of mission in Jordan and the you'd Arab Emirates and counselor in Syria among other roles. Ambassador Ronald Nunez to his right is president of the American academy of diplomacy and served three times as ambassador to al jeer y Iran and most recently to Afghanistan from 2005 to 7. He served in Baghdad coordinating political aspect was to military intervention in you Iraq at the time. He was deputy assistant secretary in the bureau of middle even eastern affairs in the Clinton administration and other senior roles. I think you get idea. There is a tremendous amount of expertise here. During the Obama second term. She was principle deputy assistant Secretary of State for economic and business affairs and serve add among many other important roles as deputy chief of mission and deputy assistant secretary for narcotics and law enforcement. She is going to take it from me this a moment and moderate a conversation for about 45 minutes with our expert guests before we open it to all of you. For your questions, you'll see people going around with note cards, please pass your questions in writing to them and they'll bring them to us where we will select that's are representative of the group to pose to our expert panel. Thank you to our guests and we look forward to a great conversation. [applause] . in moderating the dream team, by the way , the dream team was the basketball team. I won't go into that. As you can see with the vast experience they have all across the Middle East, deep experience from years in the diplomatic service, I wanted to start the panel as follows, to talk a little bit about what is happening inside the region. Then we'll get to what is happening between the U.S. and Iran. And then if we have time we'll put it in the bigger political context. To draw on your deep history knowledge of the history of the culture and our bilateral relations, I want each of to you talk for a couple of minutes on the power dynamics taking place today within the region and specifically to talk about how Iran is perceived by its neighbors in the gulf. Thank you. Delighted to be here with all all of you today. The basic elements of the power dynamics in the region are particularly the competition between Iran and the major states of the gcc in the gulf. Saudi Arabia. And between Iran and Israel as well. When you look at the reach of the region, whether what you are looking at is the reaction of the other states to what is broadly perceived as Iran expansion programs, its search for gemny in the region and the reaction of those states to what they see as the threat from an expansionist Iranen state. That of course plays into what we're going to be talking about a little bit later on in terms of U.S. and Iran and the other states. So three aspects of Iranian behavior quickly, one is the ballistic missile programs, second is Iranian interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors. In the gulf context that is Yemen. And third is Iranian support for terrorism and how the region responds the those three perceived threats. all of those threats real. You have to take one thing into context. This is not a new development. I've talked to many gulf leaders all of whom say it was the same in the days of the shah. It's been in this area for the last several centuries. This is not terribly new. In fact, if anything for the small states in the gulf , the problem in the last century or so has gotten much more difficult because there are two red tear powers. Someone Saudi Arabia on one side which has a dispute with Iran and seen as expansionist by the small states. They've for the last two centuries tried to find an outside protector. The gulf states were prepared to give up a certain amount of independence in return for their protection. After the British left, the United States was seen as supporting both Saudi Arabia and Iran against their interest. They saw Iraq as a valuable to both countries for years. Iraq was seen as a plus for most of the gulf states except Kuwait. When we took them out, we destroyed their own balance of power. Iran is the strongest country in the gulf far and away and without outside protection would be the principle threat to the gulf states. However this is not to say they are not other threats as well such as Saudi Arabia. Iran is perceived differently to different countries. They've just moved up the ladder. Remember the leadership of the states in several cases has changed sand younger and break ago way from the traditional conservative almost passive defensive approach to power and feeling the musculature and challenging more so old dynamics. At the same time you have a real doubling down of monarchies defending systems. And there is a tendency particularly in the west to say monarchies, old news, gone. We've done that too back in the They've become more to progressive. They are less tolerant. Saudi Arabia of various criticism liberalizing the social benefits. It's a mixture of one respect very liberal regimes and Christian churches are open. Jewish centers are open and various places. And at the same time oppression. They are all still pretty popular. Chances of remaining are pretty good. Snog guaranteed. But the chances of them surviving in this form of government rather they are not moving to democracy and they are doubling down on not moving. And for them the lesson of the Arab spring is this thing is awful. Look what happened when you pulled down these regimes. You got chaos and god shed and all kinds of disruption that is still going on. A lot of loss of life and that's not a pretty picture and we don't want to go there. The last thing I would note in passing is the east countries are very different protect ourself each other. There is a tendency in the to us see the smaller states as being very much -- a bunch of guys running around in bed sheets. In fact they are very different from each other. They have historical differences with each other. I won't go through them doesn't say the notion that they are similar in how they regard their citizens and how they work with each other and how they work with their own people, to argue that is the same in each of them is completely incorrect. That's a good point. Let me turn to the relationship the United States has with Saudi Arabia as we build up to other things. We have a strong defense and security relationship. Many have criticized the United States for overlooking Saudi Buss and human rights. Congress passed a resolution to end involvement in the war in Yemen. This was to end human surfing in Yemen and killing. Can you give us an inside view of the U.S. Saudi relationship. How does it work and how does our diplomacy balance security interest with our support for human rights in this part of the world? it's actually a very difficult balance to strike. I I has Ron said we're dealing with political systems, with systems of government and society that are different from hours where the analytic of the two sides to really understand one another and to coordinate and cooperate is limited. What we have with Saudi Arabia is a relationship that goes back to the end of world war to and in some ways before the end of World War II that has been built around two core pillars. One is energy and recognition of Saudi Arabia as the paramount producer of oil in the world. And therefore a major anchor for global economic security. And then the other aspect , the other pillar is what we have done with the Saudis over the course of these past years in terms of building up Saudi Arabia's own defense capabilities and the second aspect is how we work with the Saudis to promote regional security in places like Afghanistan where we work closely together all the way through to the gulf to Syria, to Iran. So these have been core principles at every use administration has pursued going all the way back to the Roosevelt administration, Republican, democrat, it hasn't mattered. We have a stressful situation right now where we do have some significant differences. And those differences reflect particularly our different views about the rights of citizens, the interaction between citizen and state , the rights particularly for women, for other human rights, civil liberties. Where this has created real tension and friction between our bilateral relationship. So the question how do awe dress it? How do you balance between the partnership we have preserved for all of these years against what has been the fact frommous peered in our relationship N. my view and the Obama administration and trump administration, we need to look at what the core U.S. interests are in the region which are primarily the stability and energy pillars and to what extent or the other do you then press on these human rights? My own view is we have not pressed as much on the human right side as we should recently. We should take the murder more seriously than we have. We need to correct that balance. But I also believe that at the end of the day we do need to recognize that preserving a good strong Saudi U.S. relationship is important for to us achieve a broader objective in the region. I wanted to add a perspective I got. Because we tend to be very certain of our moral recollectty rectitudewhen we look at a murder. When I was there. What I got was wait a minute, we depend for our security on Saudi Arabia. This crown prince is under taking C.I.A. critical reforms that are essential for this stability of the place. By the way, you go on having your relations with Russia even though Putin murders citizens in various different countries. Why are you so hung and in danger of destroying this relationship and bring us into danger as well over one killing here where you tolerate multiple killings over there. I don't say that's the view you should take. I just put that out there to to show there are different views of looking at this thing. I want to turn to the U.S. relationship with Iran. It's been 40 years since the U.S. hostage taking in Iran. Since then we've had no official diplomatic relations and no embassy in Iran. Our interest there are represented by Switzerland. While there was extensive contact, most communication today is done by press statements and announcements. You lived in Iran as a younger officer and also with a director of the Iran office. You lived inside the country. Can you talk a little bit about how from that perspective with such limited context how can we manage our relations? badly. it's true. We tend to look at it superficially. As they toned look at us too. It's a very long period. There is the debillty that there are great splits in Iran. There are people for whom the revolution key piece of the revolution is maintaining the ideological friction. It creates -- I had a great time in Iran. I enjoyed the people. People who visit Iran find Iranians far more welcoming to Americans passing through than many other states there. One of the problems with our relations with Iran is whether you ought to have relations, whether you ought to improve the relations. Whether that's a good thing. When you get into negotiations you have there as you have here a need to show that you are really doing something that works well in order to pacify your domestic critics. Since the same situation exists here, that sets up a situation in which for each side a successful negotiation is one in which they have to show they've done really well which usually means the things the other side can't afford to have you show in order to pacify their critics. That's not an impossible situation as the nuclear agreement showed. But it is a very fought situation in which to hold out negotiations making it particularly fraught when you have an approach that says we'll tell you what we want add we don't really need to talk to you again. Afterwards you are going to ask questions about what it was like to live there. The U.S. pulled out of the jcpoa and other party versus remained. The eu warned they may start withdrawing from the deal. This past fall there was a report the president and President Trump with the support of the French president were moving to an agreement which included lifting of the U.S. sanctions in exchange for Iran's agreement to remain a nonnuclear weapon state. What do you think of the prospects of the U.S. and Iran getting back to the table? And if you disagree? I don't think we can do it on our own. I don't believe that the American government or the Iran government have any formulas whereby the two of us can get there. It's got to be on a grander level than just France despite its glory. The p5 plus someone probably the only vehicle around. Although principle members of the U.N. security council and eu trying to gang up on both sides. Gang up maybe the wrong term. But providing cover for both sides to come to the table and start talking to each other because frankly I don't believe that given dynamics that Iran was describing that there is any leeway on each side to make the necessary even cosmetic concessions that would permit to us come together and have a serious conversation. What would be worse would approximate coming together with each side having expectations of the other and not having them met and frankly, without going into too much detail, I think we're heading for a train wreck with Iran which could be very damaging to the world's economy in the gulf because of what it would do, what the Iranians demonstrated they could do in spades. I think it behooves us and perhaps the Iranians to try and get more international intervention to make something work. I'll take a little bit of issue with pat and take a slightly more optimistic view. And that is if you look at the Obama policy on Iran and if you look at the trump policy on Iran, what you would see are two policies that were opposed. The Obama theory of the case that was effective in the Iran nuclear deal , the jcpoa was basically if awe dressed what it was key international concern about Iranian behavior and that was its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, if you put this place an agreement to address that, then over time by bringing Iran into closer relationship with the international community, addressing their economic concerns, doing other things, you could then set up the possibility of getting the Iranians to address these other issues that I mentioned earlier that were also a broad concern about the missiles, about the interference, about support for terrorism. The trump administration took basically the opposite view which was we can't wait, we're not going to wait for the Iranians to come around on their own, they won't do it and the only way to get them to move on those issues is to basically beat them with a stick until they cry uncle. The Obama approach would work. The trump approach clearly has not worked. And what we saw with the macron initiative was an effort to basically begin the dialogue again and to bring the U.S. and Iran together at the table where they could begin to work through some of these issues. I actually think they can do that. And it's very clear from both the position of Donald trump himself and from what the Iranians have said that both sides gingerly are interested in finding a way to get back to the table. Neither of them wants the train wreck that pat is concerned about because both sides recognize that a train wreck kills a lot of people including the engineers. So both sides would like to get back to the table. And what -- the period we're in right now is the maneuvering between these two sides to figure out who is going to be the stronger party when they sit down at the table. But I do believe that they will sit down at the table probably sometime before our presidential election next year. Optimism is free. Having said that I'm not quite as optimistic. I would joust just note two things. One is the legacy of suspicion and distrust. It's not only an American legacy. It's a huge Iranian legacy going well back into the 50's when we overthrew an Iranian government. Something which they never forget. I remember my friend who was one of the hostages and has been a real advocate of the two countries working together. Talking to an Iranian saying you have to get over that hostage stuff. He said yes, I agree, we should. But never it was answer. We've had several initiatives of reaching out and in each case we walk add way and betrayed things. I do not think -- we will see. You could -- I think what is -- there is a recognition of what pat was talking about train wreck possibility. That's not just Iranians, that's the Saudis and uae. On various sides how do we talk about this and deconflict. I think it is knock on wood possible that we will avoid the ultimate stupidity of war because there is a recognition of just how dangerous that is. And so there is this kind of tentative reaching outlooking for ways to low ter temperature and deconflict. I am personally very pessimistic particularly given the long history and the sense -- Iran has a sense of we made an agreement and you walked away from it. So what is the point because you can't trust the northern hold to an agreement they make anyway. And when you look at Syria and other things with this administration of you can't even trust them to keep their own policy straight. Why get into this. I'm pessimistic you will get negotiations. Some day I think it has to happen. Not in the last year before an election I don't think. If I could add to defend myself. But the one obstacle to a trump phone conversation in New York in September it was simple issue that they were not able to decide whether or not a U.S. reductions in sanctions would come before the call or after the call. But the two had agreed to make the call. And again you are absolutely right, I don't think that it will be an easy negotiation. We know it was not an easy negotiation in 2015 either. But the reality is whether you like it or not the one thing that maximum pressure has Dunn is it has inflicted real economic pain on Iran. And therefore they have a strong incentive try to figure out how the deal with us in a way to get sanctions reduction. And I think -- I don't think they are going to do it because they love us. I don't think they are going to do it -- but I think ha both sides will make the decision to go back to negotiating table because both sides recognize that it's in their interest to do it. I prefer you to be right. I'm going to add one thing. I ran the sanctions team at the state department. The last time when we squeezed Iran, we got very good at sanctions. So we had capabilities today that we didn't have last time and they were pretty good. we are very good at sanctions. The Iranians say they are offering graduate courses on how the avoid American sanctions. They have more limited capacity to do that. We have dug ourself, we and the Iranians have both dug ourselves into a public position, Pompeo's ultimatum to the Iranians resembles 19 14. Surrender everything before we talk to you. I don't see this administration easily backing off of it and I don't see the Iranians trusting us if we have the conversation that it will happen. I remember when we did have the first reformist Iranian president in which collectively in our wisdom we decided if we were nice to them it wouldn't work. We might help them. This is partly the mind that's the Iranians are working from that they see on our side. We're going to come back here a year from today and we'll see who is right. if I'm right we're not going to be able to afford gasoline get here. We may have to meet in a bunker. the United States has a strong military presence in the region. I know several of you have served in the gulf. Hosting 5,000 military personnel, 10,000 approximate qatar and two bases. The role of Kuwait international airport. We have sent more personnel to Saudi Arabia and we've launched a new security initiative construct in the region to protect shipping. Many of the gulf countries are increasing their own capabilities as well. How does had affect power dynamics in the region and our U.S. interests? partly this rush to become the owners of the biggest arsenals in the world is meant to deal with the Iranians. I think it is a bit of a power play between the gulf states. We don't trust each other. The recent when cutter was blockaded by the neighbors, they felt I don't know how much justification but they convinced themselves that the only reason the Saudis weren't coming across the border is they didn't want to telegraph their intent by massing on the border. What is on the books, Saudi Arabia is a much larger more powerful country than qatar. They see their military as having two real functions. Someone deterring an attack by their neighbors, or long enough for the Americans to get there. And secondly dealing with the potential of the breakdown and order they talk a lot about breakdown of orderer in Saudi Arabia. Their nightmare would be civil war in Saudi Arabia if something happened which is something they talk about a lot. I think the uae buildup of military force is aimed at Iran and building up the weight in the gulf cooperation council. And my experience of the uae has the same sort of dark look at Saudi Arabia's own power pretension. The Saudis have been chip ago way at the border for generations. I think a very large portion of that is part of the jockeying for power between the gulf states. You asked particularly about the military balance and how the buildup of gulf states changes that. The sort answer is very little. These are fundamentally weak states who are very aware of their weakness. They made a real effort to expand the quality of its military to some extent I think has succeeded and shown a certain ability for power projection effectively. The Saudi military has shown very poorly. Went into Yemen and it has really done badly. They reminded me of something my father said to me years ago when the Soviets went into Afghanistan and said every country entitled to the Vietnam of its choice. First of all, there are economically powerful and weak. They want to exaggerate a lot of the buildup of supplies but don't have to use it. I remember reading once there was a technique of riding your camels in a circle to stir up the dust so the enemy would be frightened by the size of your force and you wouldn't have to fight them. There is some of that still going on. You look at them. They have enormous dependence on their decal nation facilities, on the oil refineries. These things are all vulnerable to missile attack. You can have these societies crippled quickly in a war really clear. And they have small populations. They can't have a large military. They can have a lot of equipment. They can hire a certain number of mercenaries to help them run it. But they don't have v the population base to have a strong military. In several cases they've gotten used to foreigners doing this stuff. The Saudis have had several military experiences including the first gulf war and none of them they have shown particular military greatness. Less than two million people in the whole country. These are fundamentally weak states. The bottom line is they can get more powerful to some extent for their own protection, not to the exThant we can use that as a change in our relationship. I would say that two critical developments over the last ten years that have driven these decisions, particularly again by Saudi Arabia and the uae to build their own internal security capabilities. One was the perception rightly or wrong think perception that U.S. commitment, U.S. interests and U.S. willingness to carry through on our long standing defense and security umbrella for the gulf is fading. And you can go back to the Obama administration. You can even go back to the George H. bush administration and see a declining level of interest to the gulf states that has played out. The second issue is the collapse of the traditional Sooni Arab leadership. Particular think focus Egypt has had since 2010. The collapse of Syria, of Iraq as pillars of the Sooni Arab world. And therefore what you have seen are two things. One the rise of the gulf states and their view that they are now responsible for leadership in the Sooni world. And that is exacerbated or compounded by the younger leadership, the more ambitious leadership that we have. Therefore as a result of these two things we've seen two developments. Someone they are no longer relying on the United States. You see this in turn towards a more positive, more focused relations with Russia and China. But you also see anytime terms of their decisions they are going to take on greater responsibility for their own security, their own protection than they did before. They are not going to wait for the seventh Calgary to come over the horizon anymore. They are going to take that on themselves. Now we can talk about whether they are good at it or not good at I, it doesn't matter. The reality is that's a decision they are making and they are going to purr site and that has strong implications in terms of our own role and responsibilities in the region going forward. If I could add one quick point the this. We say we don't need the gulf because we are an oil exporting country reenforces this perception that when the balloon goes up we're not going to come for it. That is nonsense. I want to wrap up by putting this in a larger context before we get to the questions. What relevance does gulf region have in the broader geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China and the U.S. and Russia? I'll take a swing at China. I don't think it has to be part of the competition. China is very dependent on the gulf. I forget the numbers. the gulf. If there is one country for whom a major war in the gulf would be catastrophic to their economy it's China and I'm speechless at the Chinese refuse toll get involved. Maybe it's their whole political history in modern times. They don't want to get involved. They have sort of vent to sanctions are a blockade to oil. They have the most to lose and they are not doing anything. I don't think they are looking for any confrontation. I don't believe that the Chinese see themselves moving into the gulf. Vladimir Putin is a guy who has played a weak hand very, very well. Russia does not have thisth economic or the military or the diplomatic capacity to really challenge the United States and the region. But he is a past master at identifying vacuums and figuring out how Russia can move in. And he is somebody who has a vision of Russia as a great power who believes that Russia by dent of its great power status should have a seat at the table when all of these political and security issues are debated in the Middle East. He's going to do that. At the end of the day he is not our competition. The competition ha the U.S. has in terms of the great powers is China. China is eating our lunch economically. They are becoming increasingly the number one economic partner for the gulf states. That's going to continue. I agree with pat that the Chinese are perfectly willing to let us take on the hard issues of security and stability in the region while they focus on building their economic relations and prospering through the relationships with the gulf states. But I think that is also changing. I don't think it's an distant the only two -- an distant the only two naval facilities China has outside China are Pakistan and in the horn of Africa because they understand their security and their economic survival depends on access through those waterways to the energy and also to the export markets. there are no Chinese military forces there. they have the capability. There is nothing stationed there. But they have the capability of using it for military. They are gingerly moving into some of these more aggressive positions. But you are right that what they want to do is they want to us take the headaches and let them take the money. I do think what you are seeing is overall a less stable world. I agree with my colleagues that the gulf states are less secure in their relationship with us and they are therefore looking elsewhere and in particular the Russians. The problem is they are looking to their own defenses building them. these are policies which they feel they are forced to because they can't rely on the relationship they had with us. But they are not able to supplant that relationship. The Russians will sell them arms but they are not going to come to their defense. Their own defense capabilities for all the equipment remain weak. So what you have is a relationship where we're not quite backing away. We got a lot of troops there. But they are unsure of us and it's not clear what we're actually prepared to do. Building up their arsenals without the real capacity to to deter the people they are most worried about. When you have that altogether you have a less secure region and more dangerous one. When you have the solid U.S. relationship, clumsy as it might often have been, everybody knew where you were. Therefore you didn't mess with it. Now you have one that is very shaky and uncertain and that has room for mistakes. we will now turn to questions. thanks so much for being here. I'll be giving you your first question. How do you see the increased wave of protest impacting the Iranian regime. These are the current ones. you want to predict future. This is really tough. they are posing threats. The regime is incredibly ware of the danger of these riots. You are seeing the fact there are social cracks after these years since the Iran revolution. I personally doubt this period will lead to that much change. I think if there is one lesson that the older leaders of the revolution really learned from the revolution itself, it was how they gained strength as the shaw vacillate. You had a period during the revolution where the shah had put down. demonstrations and then he would not always. And move back and forth. As he vacillated, the demonstrations got bigger and bigger. If there is any lesson which I think the older revolutionary leaders have carried away, it is not to make the mistake of the shah. I believe they will put these eye riots down. They have a lot of force but don't have leadership. The revolution had leadership in the wings ready to come forth and take hold. I don't think they have it. I think you have something that is very interesting. It shows you how much dissatisfaction there is. Whether or not after this you get something else, but I don't believe these riots themselves are going to lead tie lot of change real quick. I would say I agree completely with that. The absence of a coherent or popular Iranian revolutionary presence abroad. Right now the United States is chose on the support probably the single most hated Iranian exile organization as the substitute. I think I saw something today which said they have already killed about 100 demonstrators in Iran. I agree completely with Ron they are going to do whatever they need to do to stop the demonstrations. They have been very clear. What you need to remember is that the methodology that Assad has used in sir y he was taught by the Iranians. That is the irgc that went into Syria and really helped the shah use the extreme measures that he's used in order to stop the Syrian uprising. The riots in Iraq have much more potential for political change but that was not the question. thank you again for being here. I am a , Jr. in the Ford school undergraduate program. The next question we have for you is how do U.S. relations in the gulf interact with U.S. relations with Israel in particular how do U.S. Saudi relations with the U.S. involvement with Saudi Arabia in Yemen impact Israel? there was a theory in the trump administration that because the Israelis and the gulf -- an opportunity actually push forward this idea of what is outside in. You could get gulf states to take steps to normalize the relationship with Israel on this basis and to open diplomatic relations to do all the other steps regardless of where the Israelis were in their negotiations with the Palestinians. I think what eve seenover the past couple of years is that expectation, that idea was vastly exaggerated. And that while the two sides there, is no doubt that quietly under the table Israelis and gulf Arabs are working much more closely together, that the gulf states are more willing to be open about the nature of some of their relationships, particularly on the security side than they were in the past, nevertheless, nevertheless there is a cap on how farther going to be willing to go in the absence of some movement towards a resolution of the Palestinian issue and particularly the what is called the abrailroad peace initiative which is basically full normalization between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for a two state solution, Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capitol. This is the position. It is still position. And I think that the reality is that unless there is something that addresses Palestinian requirements, you are not going to see the gulf states go beyond the. if I could add one point. I've seen this movie before in the course of my career. There have been I can think of three historical instance when is American policy beginning with the mom tear sen toe aligns that led to the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq where we were going get Israel and the further Arab states against the Soviet union. We tried et a couple more times. Hague was building a trying to build a aligns against -- I forget if it was Soviet union or Iran at this point. Soviet union with the gulf states. So we've done this. We've done had several times. We think that we have no memory so it's a fresh idea. Exactly. next question. next question for you. What are the most effective strategies for combating Iranian backed groups in the Middle East? since we haven't seen one yet it's hard to know what it will be. we're doing our best to fix the problem so you dry up the swamp in which they dwell. if you try deal with them directly, this is their turf, they know their turf, they know how the survive in that turf. If progress on the Palestinian issue. I don't even know how the deal with Iraq. I couldn't begin at this moment the suggest how we deal the Iraqis. The Iranians have gotten a lot of power in Iraq. But the Iranians are not well liked. And Americans are often make the mistake of thinking because they are if I rack therefore somehow they are close to the Iranians. They forget eight years of the Iran Iraq war with thousands of people killed. They never changed sides. They never went over against their own government. When I served in Iraq after our invasion, you could -- it was not good for you if you were an Iraq can I politician to be seen as too close to the Iranians. Now you are getting a lot of push back. The Iranians do best this Iraq when the country unstable. Because then they can work with different power centers for their own interests. They always had the risk that a stable Iraq would be a threat to Iran again as it was back to the battle so this is a not new thing. We keep reminding you things are not so new. Right now they have a -- I think one can say that some things -- things one should not do are clearer. Right now when you have a lot of backlash against Iranian pressure is a good time for to us kind of shut up and sit down and not to be very heavily involved. Kind of consult quietly with people. You have a very volatile politics. You have some things going in the direction we kind of like. So don't try -- we have a desire usually to do something. This is one of those places where you are much better off right now watch it golf you may see an opportunity to do something useful. But don't assume you have to do something. one quick point. Just to set at rest this question of Iranian shia control over Iraq. Looking at theological terms. Require ace certain historical perspective to know what you are talking about. if I can just add the experience in Yemen and I think it kind of sharp Tennessee point en the pointthat Ron and pat were making that they've been able to establish relations to work, to build aen lines, relationships, Israeli unique to that set of circumstances. In the case of Yemen where you have the hooties. Yes they have a relationship with Iran. Yes they have exploited that relationship and the Iranians have exploited the relationship in order to achieve an object they've they have which is to stress and put pressure on Saudi Arabia. But nevertheless the issues that are unique to the conflict that is goingen in no one Yemen right now are issues that are internal to Yemen. They are not fighting because they are partners or proxies of Iran. They are fighting because of their circumstances in Yemen. And the best thing that we can do to the exThant we can do it is to help resolve those internal issues. If you deny the Iranians the vacuum that they have been very successful at exploiting, then you can deny them the air they need to develop these relationships. And that is true I think with Iraq, in Lebanon and it's absolutely flew Yemen. the basic point that underlies all of these is you have to actually know something. And you have to pay attention to the different situations and the differences and you can't do this on the basis of kind of two dimensional policy and sound bytes about Iran which is where we carry out our public discussion. You have to know about Canterbury. we'll go to the next question. we have a question turning towards combating terrorism. Can the Arab coalition of states be trusted to combat terrorism in line with U.S. and global geopolitical interests? maybe sometimes no. Mostly no. it depends on -- I think that the Saudis were good partners for us in fighting against Al Qaeda and the Arabian peninsula. We had a lot of success. There was one particular instance you may or may not remember called the cartridge bomb attempt in 2010. Where there was an attempt to smuggle explosives on board an airplane in printer cartridges. We would not have known about that. We would not have caught on to that had it not been for Saudi intelligence and their tipping us offnd the British off about this plot. So there have been instances where in fact they were extremely important partners for us. Saudi policy has on occasion exacerbated terrorist threats and Mayed made it more difficult for to us deal, Libya being a good example. How does turkey and the president fit into the equation? badly. turkey has a lot of it own agenda. It's feeling its oats as it's moved into Syria. Turkey has end in certain areas. It's helped combat extreme movements. At the same time many parts of Syria you have turkey being quite tolerant of movements with the Islamic state because the turks are worried about other things. They are far more worried about Kurdish terrorism than the Islamic state. If helping works, they'll help. But if helping gets us gets crossways with where they see a stronger threat and interest, then they are not so helpful. Turks also are really feeling their oats on an expansion of their influence. This is like policy 2.0 because they had same same view after the breakup with the central union. The lift was way heavier than they had capacity to undertake. Now they are kind of trying some of that again. And again I think they are going to find that their am -- their reach I think exceeds their grasp. I would add there is an internal dynamic. He came to power how many years now. His first 7 or 8 years in power were fantastic. The best ruler, best leader of modern turkey you could imagine. He did bring an enormous difference for turkey. Some place along the line, he has had problems. The problems reflect themselves in election results, local election versus not gone well for him. And like most guys who -- like most leaders who want to stay in power an occasional foreign adventure is not a bad thing properly managed. Your comments at the beginning you commented on the potential of some sort of movement or lack of potential for movement in Iranian U.S. relations. I'm wondering what does recent rise in tensions between Israel and Iran mark bedty Israeli air force strikes against targets in Syria a couple of days ago suggest about Iranian ambitions in Syria and what is the risk of this turn into a larger conflict and impacting the potential for change? this is one of those places where I don't believe that the two countries really have annexo essential view of the other as a threat. I think a lot of this is Iran trying to maintain its controls or its influence in Syria. And in large mart is Israeli domestic politics because it's really use to feel have the Iranians as the boogie man sitting out there. I think this is more of a hype inside the United States and domesticically in both countries, hype rather than -- I don't think either country wants to have a war with the other. there is no doubt that the Iranians were far more invested in the survival of the saA sad and his regime than the Russians are. That for Iran Assad is an important partner. Access to Lebanon through Syria is incredibly important. I think for their own reasons. The Iranians see the ability to expand their military partnership with his Bo La in Syria as well as Lebanon is use informal personals of threatening Israel. The Israelis have responded. I think interesting something the Israeli versus responded extremely aggressively against Iranian presence. They have gone after the Iranian arms depos. They have killed a number of Iranians in Syria. It's one of those situations where the two sides have decide this is a game they are going to play and keep it confined to this particular battleground and not allow it to spill out into other kinds of conflict. thank you. How does current state of U.S. Iran relations affect U.S. diplomatic efforts in the country to Iran's east Afghanistan? what is happening in Afghanistan , the Iranians were initially quite supportive of intervention in Afghanistan. There is a big difference in the way they look at Afghanistan. Iraq is a historic threat to Iran. The shah years ago, every year the troops had an annual military exercise where they exercised on the basis of the Iraqi invasion of Iran pushing Iraqis back. Afghanistan is not a strategic threat. They get nervous about us. This were very helpful in the negotiations in putting government in place in Afghanistan. I think I had probably the last meeting with the Iranians in Afghanistan up until 2005ment Ted last such meeting that was ordered to suspend them because we wanted to put pressure on them about nuclear weapons. I argued with secretary rice that was a bad decision and I lost. She was boss. Anyway they remained fairly supportive. Very nervous about when we put troops to their border. But otherwise supportive. They became belligerent pushening to Afghans. But now the kicker is that they are very concerned about two things. Someone the growth of the Islamic state presence in Afghanistan. And the other is the perception that we're not going to hold up our continued involvement in Afghanistan. And they can't -- the situation is going to get worse. So from their point of view , the greater danger between Taliban and Islamic state is the Islamic state. If that means they need to warm up their relations with the Taliban this order to prepare for the expected panic departure of the U.S. and collapse of Afghanistan, that's what they are doing. You have a warming of relations between Iranians and the Taliban as you have between the Russians and the Taliban. And in both cases it is premised on the two perceptions Islamic state is a bigger threat and I can't trust Americans to hold up their end in Afghanistan. They are going to walk out and leave chaos and I got to have friends. turning to humanitarian issues. How concerned should we be about the human cost of sanction on Iran for ordinary Iranian civilians? how much we should be or how much are? should be? if you are looking at it from a purely moral and ethical point of view. It's a little bit like our sanctions on Iraq up to the 2003 war in which we frankly -- we took a position that the humanitarian crisis that we created in Iraq it was fault of Saddam Hugh sane and tried to sell that domesticically. I don't think we managed to sell it. If we try and sell the same story in Iran, I don't think it's going to be sold. The human -- there was always been a bit of humanitarian crisis. We've aggravated the humanitarian crisis in Iran. We with a few exceptions I think the Iran government will do a good job of convincing the Iranian people it's the American's fault. That's an important point. One the official U.S. position is that we are not interested in punishing the Iranian people. We are interested in putting pressure on the regime. The reality is the opposite. That in fact the weight of U.S. sanctions is falling on the common people. And as Ron said earlier and my wife used to lead tourist in Iran, I told her to stop. She said that the Americans on her tours were always amazed about the warmth Torre acception that they got. The fact that the common Iranian people liked Americans. And they liked America. And they felt as though were it not for the political differences that they would be able to have a good relationship with us. The risk that we run is that we are changing that perception and that we're building opposition. We're building anger against the United States among the Iranian population. And that's going to do two things. One is it's going to strengthen the regime because it means the as pat said the regime can say it's not us, we're not the reason that the economy is collapsing. We're not the reason that your life is so difficult. It's because of those Americans. And the second thing is that when the day comes and it will come that we would like to normalize the relationship with Iran, that we would like to get back to business with Iran, that there is going to be popular resistance within Iran to doing that, that is going to make it much harder to achieve our objectives. Let me add a comment on sanctions. Sanctions are an effective tool if you outline cheerily behavior that you want to change. In the current long list of sanks on Iran and I'm not an expert on Iran, there is no desired behavior that is enunciated. We don't have a clear policy of what we want them to do other than denuclearize generally F. you outline the behavior. Let me add another point N. fine tuning, we're able to allow exceptions and to allow certain things to go through etc. But the intent is really for the behavior of a state to change. The trump administration as I just said has not enunciated when it wants to achieve. So the pressure felt, politically it is played up domesticically. And the longer they run , the harder they hit. there is even. I take the same point and take it further. The deepest lack of clarity and this has been true for several administrations. Not just this one. Is whether policy is about change in behavior or regime overthrow. As long and we send mixed signals. As long as the belief a possibility that what our policy is ability is regime change, then there is no reason to make the concessions necessary because you are just weakening yourself, you are setting yourself up for the next round. The concessions which we say we want in sanctions on behavior, it really only makes sense even if you wanted to have that agreement if you believe that is what the Americans are really about. It's not about regime change. And the way we talk about leaves you very uncertain of what the policy is or what the policy will be tomorrow. Some sanctions are very targeted. When we sanctioned some Russians in the context of cyber, it's very targeted. Like stop hitting us, we're going to sanction and then we'll use more offensive ways to cyber come. Any other questions? last question. between this and cocktail time. What is your at vice on how students interested in Middle East diplomacy can best prepare to succeed? With all of your years of wisdom. I tried the first which is succeed at what you are doing right now. Come out of here, do well in school. And then just get to know as much as you can about the Middle East. There are no magic formula. It's a well educated person who has educated himself on the region, who has a real interest, you need start developing a visceral interest in the area. And that's the best way to prepare for itful? did you choose it or stumble into it? I stumbled. Most of my life I've stumbled into things and I stumbled into this. this one I chose. I had three months in graduate school before I joined the military. I went to visit my parents in Afghanistan and that's where I began. We could all pontificate for hours up here and that would really delay the cocktail. You'll never be fully expert. You have to recognize what a colleague told me going to one post, you will never understand country as clearly as on the day arrive. Because you think you have a perception, you get into the details, you learn more and more, it gets harder and harder to make simple bottom line judgments. Recognize this is a lifetime business. Not to be discouraged. Understand that you come out of here with is a basis on which to go forth and learn. It is not a basis of knowledge sufficient to already proclaim how things ought to be. So prepare yourself that the history, these are countries which have an enormous sense of history. And this is often impedestrian Tom them. It's really hard to go forward when you spend a lot of time looking backwards. You need understand the history. You need to understand where people are copping from. Then you go and learn to listen. And my old boss the late Saunders who was involved in negotiations and other things who really had an understanding of the psychological dimensions of negotiations as well. And he had a saying which was listen deeply enough to be changed by what you hear. And it's an enormously important point of both scholarship and diplomacy. If you want to get other people to do things your way and like it, you have to know what their way is. As well as the history and knowledge having a certain amount of humility and learning to listen and spend a lot of time listening is a good thing to learn. very early on had to make a choice between studying Russian and Arabic. And I realized if I was going to study either of these languages and spend next 15 to 25 years of my life in that part of the world, I like lamb better than I like cabbage. On that note. I want to thank you and thank the audience. [applause] outside we'll have a reception. I don't believe we're serving cabbage. There may be lamb. One more round of thanks for this wonderful panel. [applause]